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Abstract 
Characterized by globalization, increasing pluralism, and new complexities of citizenship, the contemporary 
world poses challenges to the ways in which we conceptualize of the processes of searching for shared solu-
tions to ever-complicated social problems. While the political rhetoric emphasizes the value of citizens’ par-
ticipation, engagement, and “voices,” there are increasing feelings of frustration, incapacity, and disinterest 
on behalf of the citizens regarding the supposed eff ects of their political engagement. In order to conceptually 
grasp the problem of searching for shared solutions and the related challenges to education, we draw on John 
Dewey’s idea of the method of democracy and complement it with some critical perspectives inspired by 
Antonio Gramsci. We then refl ect on the implications of these ideas on contemporary adult education by dis-
cussing the notion of competence within the theoretical framework that we develop. On the whole, our work 
aims to contribute in establishing a framework for understanding the role of adult education in the process of 
ensuring a functional democratic society. 
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Introduction
In contemporary Europe, citizen engagement and participation in the search for solutions 
to shared social problems and policymaking issues has been increasingly discussed.2 Con-
sequently, the meaning of democracy has expanded from liberal forms of governance in 
which citizens exercise their democratic rights by visiting ballot-boxes in free multiparty 
elections towards including more deliberative forms of democracy,3 involving citizens’ 
1 Th is article is a part of a larger research project, Growth into Citizenship in Civil Society Encounters, funded by the 
Academy of Finland. It is a consortium project in collaboration with the University of Eastern Finland (decision no. 
2285733-9) and the University of Jyväskylä (decision no. 02458904-7).
2 Andrew Power, “EU Legitimacy and New Forms of Citizen Engagement,” Electronic Journal of e-Government 8 
(2010): 45-54. 
3 See, for example, John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), doi: 10.1093/019925043X.001.0001.
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direct participation in debates concerning social challenges. Th ese challenges, such as eco-
nomic crises and climate change, are complex and global in scope. Furthermore, European 
societies face increasing pluralism as a result of secularization on the one hand, and the 
proliferating movement of people across the globe on the other. Th is is to say that they 
are the seats of multiple value systems that should all be considered in political decision 
making. Especially in the Nordic context with the rapid expansion in the number of immi-
grants and refugees, current political debates are characterized by a shift from a relatively 
homogenous value base towards a need to take into account and engage multiple religi-
ous, ideological, and cultural groups.
Along with the Habermasian theory of communicative action, John Dewey’s ideas 
about “the method of democracy” have been a source of inspiration for those attempting 
to explain both the theoretical and practical foundations for citizens’ participation as well 
as the ways in which citizenship competencies can be fostered so that such participation 
would actually occur. In this article, we will off er a new insight to the theoretical discussion 
on these issues. We fi rst develop a framework derived from the work of two philosophers, 
John Dewey and Antonio Gramsci, both renowned for their work on democracy, partici-
pation, and education. We will then argue that combining the positive aspirations of John 
Dewey’s (1859-1952) method of democracy with Antonio Gramsci’s (1891-1937) analysis of 
hegemony provides a valuable framework for maneuvering along the rocky road of growth 
into contemporary citizenship.4 
Background for Studying Dewey and Gramsci
Our main reason for selecting particularly these two philosophers is, basically, that both 
philosophers have defi ned the concept of democracy as extending beyond mere parlia-
mentary structures. For Dewey, according to his often quoted description, “A democracy 
is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint 
communicated experience.”5 A Deweyan democracy requires a lot from its citizens, and 
Dewey specifi cally emphasized the role of education in fostering democratic success. Alter-
natively, in his work, Gramsci built upon and revised the communist idea of a party-led 
democracy by developing it into a conception of a “pluralist grassroots democracy.”6 Emp-
4 Th e philosophical insights of both Dewey and Gramsci have been utilized in a number of approaches to adult edu-
cation, such as progressive, experiential, critical, and transformative. We do not engage with these traditions per se. 
However, by means of philosophical analysis and the synthesis of the original texts of Dewey and Gramsci, we aim 
to fi nd new perspectives on contemporary questions concerning adult education in the social and political con-
text. In particular, our pursuit is to combine the positive possibilities of fostering democracy, typical of Deweyan 
approaches, with the emphasis of critical consciousness, typical of Gramscian approaches. 
5 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Th e Macmillan Company, 1916), 101. 
6 Carlos Nelson Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Th ought (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012), 19, doi: 
10.1163/9789004230255. For Gramsci, this means, for example, advocating for factory councils as units of demo-
cracy in a critique of a hegemonic liberal democratic system. Along these lines, John Schwarzmantel contends 
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hasis here is placed on the capacities of each and every citizen in the realization of this new 
form of democracy, where every citizen can be said to “govern” in some way.7
Both Dewey’s and Gramsci’s ideas of democracy interpret citizenship as a process of 
engagement. Th eir ideas, although diff erent in many ways, both relate interestingly to the 
current debates on the concept of citizenship, which is increasingly being understood as 
involving social membership in communities and networks not restricted within the bor-
ders of a particular state.8 As a result, the citizens’ commitment to solving problems outside 
of the traditional projects of nation-building requires new possibilities for participation. 
At the same time, however, there are continuing trends of “there is no alternative”9 
policymaking, which have been observed as limiting the possibilities of real participation 
on the part of the citizens. Th e political objective of actually listening to citizens’ voices is 
often realized strictly in order to allow for people to select from a set of more or less pre-
defi ned options and to gain public approval for ready-made decisions that merely appear 
to have been made by the people themselves. For example, in the framework of neoliberal 
policy, concepts with positive connotations, such as “individual freedom” and “reform,” 
are used to motivate people’s consent to the implementation of privatization policies that 
may actually have negative consequences on their lives.10 As a result, the citizens’ frustra-
tion with such policies creates uncertainty and is parasitic upon their motivation to take 
part in shared problem-solving.
Generally speaking, the complexity of issues, the plurality of participants, and “quasi-
democratic” engagement mechanisms now require that citizens have a new set of compe-
tencies in order to actively participate in this emerging democratic context. Obtaining such 
competencies increasingly takes place beyond traditional formal educational systems. For 
example, various civil society organizations, including associations established by migrants, 
neighborhood or civic education organizations, have assumed a signifi cant role in develop-
ing such competencies by implementing a wide variety of programs in support of empow-
ered and active citizenship. Drawing on Dewey, we suggest that the process of inculcation 
into fully active citizenship involves a continuous process of participation. However, the 
road to citizenship is a rocky one, and those very processes involve complex power strug-
gles. Th e main objective of this article is to provide theoretical sign-posts for the journey 
along this road. 
We employ the method of rational reconstruction in our philosophical analysis. Con-
trary to historical reconstruction, which aims at understanding the ideas of a philosopher 
that the concept of democracy discussed in the “Prison Notebooks” was new and diff erent from the orthodox 
communism in Th e Routledge Guide to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (London: Routledge, 2015), 60. 
7 Gramsci, SPN, 40. SPN refers to the Selection from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare 
and Geoff ret Nowell Smith. 1971. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
8 See, for example, Sian Lazar, Th e Anthropology of Citizenship: A Reader (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). 
9 Th is kind of “TNA policy” in the contemporary era has often been attributed to the neoliberal political regime 
of Margaret Th atcher. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 
39-40.
10 Countinho, Gramsci’s Political Th ought, 159.
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on his or her own terms and as a representative of his or her own particular time and con-
text, rational reconstruction approaches philosophical texts in order to fi nd new insights 
that may be helpful in answering contemporary questions.11 Th e choice of the method of 
rational reconstruction implies, for example, that we do not read Gramsci primarily as a 
contributor to the Marxist tradition, or Dewey in relation to the American pragmatism 
of his time. Rather, we re-interpret the work of these scholars from the viewpoint of con-
temporary questions and problems. Consequently, we do not engage with the academic 
debates over the “proper” interpretations of Dewey and Gramsci.12 In particular, we are 
interested in the conceptual understanding that we can tease out of the work of these two 
authors in order to make sense of the gap between the rhetoric of citizens’ participation 
and the practice of “there is no alternative” decision-making, and between the urgent need 
to collectively solve social problems and the apparent diffi  culties in attempting to do so. In 
other words, we are concerned with providing an adequate understanding of the processes 
of democratic deliberation while taking into account the power struggles involved and, in 
particular, how the proposed conceptualization relates to the challenges of contemporary 
adult citizenship education. 
As a result of our analysis, we suggest that Dewey’s method of democracy comple-
mented by Gramsci’s interpretation of hegemony, and in particular, his notions of consent 
and coherence, provide a valuable conceptual framework for addressing these concerns. 
In our view, this framework captures the importance of listening to “citizens’ voices” in the 
context of increasing plurality and complexity. However, this framework is not blind to the 
real-life problems that arise as a result of the constitution of the voices in the fi rst place. In 
contrast, it provides conceptual tools for understanding the processes of obtaining consent 
and assuring a certain level of coherence with respect to the contributing voices so that 
they can be heard and taken into account in the processes of searching for shared solutions. 
Drawing on our conceptual work, we propose that citizenship education for adults should 
be administered as forms of continuous interactive support for eff ective participation, the 
construction of a coherent voice, and the ability to understand the ways in which political 
problems are framed. 
11 Richard Rorty, “Th e Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” in Philosophy in History: Essays on Historiogra-
phy of Philosophy, eds. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 50-56, doi: 10.1017/
cbo9780511625534.006. 
12 For example, as Gramsci’s texts are fragmented and at times more like political activism than theoretical elabora-
tion, there are continuous critical debates over the defi nitions of his concepts, as well as his relation to Marxism 
and Leninism. In our attempt of rational reconstruction, our views are in line with those of Stuart Hall in his “Gram-
sci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity” (in eds. David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, Critical Dialogues 
in Cultural Studies, London: Routledge, 1996), 411-440, where he elaborates on how Gramsci distanced himself 
from the contemporary orthodox Marxism and further elaborated Marxist concepts in order to understand the 
“modern” world of his time. He innovatively used many existing theoretical formulations to illustrate the situa-
tion in Italy of his time. Since his time, Gramsci’s own concepts have been used and further refi ned, addressing a 
number of problems of hegemony such as race and gender, and not only in relation to the class struggle that was 
a burning issue in the political life of Gramsci’s Europe. 
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Dewey’s Method of Democracy
Th e method of democracy13 is Dewey’s proposal for a method for solving social problems.14 
With this method, Dewey is not merely referring to general democratic procedures, such 
as voting or compromising, but to the wider possibilities of facilitating participation and 
cooperation, or methods that could foster “a mode of associated living.”15 Dewey himself 
refers to his method as one of “organized intelligence,” and its basic idea is to bring confl ic-
ting situations “out into the open where their special claims can be discussed and judged 
in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately.”16 
In his philosophy, Dewey emphasizes the social nature of intelligence17 and argues that 
interpreting intelligence as an individual possession was a fatal mistake of earlier libera-
lism.18 Th is idea, combined with Dewey’s conception of knowledge, having its root in the 
evolutionary theory, as having evolved through adaptive processes into living circumstan-
ces, implies that Dewey rejects the arguments stating that only few human beings can 
achieve the intelligence suffi  cient for participating in the processes of solving shared pro-
blems.19 Everyone—or at least every group that has shared experiences—has intelligence 
regarding his or her own circumstances and situations in life. Th ese local “intelligences” 
must all be taken into account in solving shared problems.
One important aspect of his method of democracy is that it takes value pluralism seri-
ously.20 Th e version of value pluralism we are referring here distinguishes itself, on the one 
13 Dewey, LW11, 56. Th e numbered volumes of “LW” refer to John Dewey, Th e Later Works of John Dewey, ed., Jo Ann 
Boydston, 1985. Electronic edition ed. by Larry Hickman, 2003. Retrieved from http://www.nlx.com/collections/41.
14 Th e Deweyan concept of democracy as a whole cannot be considered within the limits of this article. It is therefore 
suffi  cient to summarize that the key to understanding Dewey’s conception of democracy is to look at the interde-
pendence between the concepts individual, social, freedom, and participation; the fl ourishing of one is dependent 
of the fl ourishing of others. Democracy, for Dewey, involves participation in various groups, both narrower and 
wider than the nation state and, in particular, the genuine contribution of the members of these groups to the 
common good and welfare. See, for example, Dewey, LW2, 326-333. For his view of the social classes of his time as 
related to a particular historical situation, see Dewey, LW11; LW13, and on how memberships of various partially 
separated and partially overlapping groups as characteristic of civil society can be seen as antecedents to some of 
the contemporary conceptions. 
15 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: Th e Macmillan Company, 1916), 101. 
16 Dewey, LW11, 56. 
17 Dewey uses the concept of intelligence in diff erent contexts. Some of his considerations of intelligence as a method 
relate to his arguments against using physical force to foster social progress. See Dewey, LW11, 46, 60. For example, 
“Liberalism and Social Action” in Dewey, LW11, 6-69 was published in 1935 and was thus Dewey’s response to the 
threat of totalitarianism at the time.
18 Dewey, LW11, 35. According to Dewey, this mistake led, for example, to “laissez-faire liberalism.” the economic and 
sociological position that he constantly criticizes (e.g., LW11).
19 Dewey, LW11, 39, 50-51.
20 Diff erent versions of value pluralism have been defended among others, in Elisabeth Anderson, “Practical Reason 
and Incommensurable Goods,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason, ed. R. Chang (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); John Kekes, Th e Morality of Pluralism (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1993); Martha Nussbaum, Th e Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Charles 
Taylor, “Th e Diversity of Goods,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, eds. B. Williams et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1982), doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511611964.008; and Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press,1981) and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985), doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139165860. 
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hand, from value relativism by accepting that there are some primary values which are 
related to basic physiological, psychological, and social needs,21 and on the other hand, it 
sets itself apart from value monism by accepting that there are secondary values varying 
fundamentally in relation to each individual person, culture, society, and historical peri-
od.22 Th e basic idea is to understand disagreements in relation to values as an inevitable 
consequence of the diverse value systems of the participants in a given problem-solving 
situation.23 Th is version of pluralism, which is in our view compatible with Dewey’s method 
of democracy, allows us to search for shared solutions without the underlying assumption 
that there might be only one predefi ned “right” solution to any moral, political, or social 
problem that we might face. 
Another important part of Dewey’s philosophy that is relevant to our work here is that 
it is fallibilist throughout. Th is is to say that for Dewey, epistemological fallibilism—the posi-
tion which holds that all of our beliefs and belief systems are susceptible to error—is appli-
cable not only to science but also to social, political, and moral inquiry. Th is implies that 
there can be no a priori knowledge concerning the best means for achieving goals, or the 
value of the goals themselves, or even the very methods of determining what these two 
might be. According to Deweyan fallibilism, everything must in principle be subjected to 
criticism. Dewey’s method of democracy thus involves: (1) the idea of not knowing before-
hand the values, political views, etc. on which the future solution should be based; (2) the 
stipulation that everything is open to discussion; and (3) the perspective that taking dif-
ferent voices into account is of crucial importance in order to fi nd the best available solu-
tion.24 
However, there are two criticisms of Dewey’s view that should be discussed if we want 
to eff ectively bring Dewey’s philosophy into the contemporary discussion of democracy 
and citizenship. First, Dewey appears to be overly optimistic about his method of demo-
cracy; he seems to believe that the same kind of progress that had recently taken place 
in science and technology could be achieved in the social realm when the right method 
21 As Kekes (1993) puts it, “Circumstances would have to be exceptional not to count as benefi ts to satisfy our basic 
physiological needs, to be loved, or to live in a society in which our endeavors are respected,” in Kekes, Th e Morality 
of Pluralism, 18. Nussbaum, for her part, develops a theory of things that “are so important that we will not count 
a life as a human life without them” as including such aspects as mortality, the human body, the capacity for plea-
sure and pain, cognitive capability, early infant development, practical reason, affi  liation with other human beings, 
relatedness to other species and nature, humor and play, and separateness. See Martha Nussbaum, “Human Func-
tioning and Social Justice,” Political Th eory 20 (1992): 216-220; see also Katariina Holma, “Essentialism Regarding 
Human Nature in the Defense of Gender Equality in Education,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (2007): x, doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9752.2007.00543.x.
22 In contemporary academic discussion, there are many diff erent conceptions termed “pluralism,” such as political 
pluralism, value pluralism, and ethical pluralism, and, of course, diff erent views of how these pluralisms should be 
defi ned. 
23 Kekes, Th e Morality of Pluralism, 23-27.
24 See also Katariina Holma and Tiina Kontinen, “Democratic Knowledge Production as a Contribution to 
Objectivity in Evaluation of Development NGOs,” Forum for Development Studies, 39 (2012): 83-103, doi: 
10.1080/08039410.2011.635379.
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was developed and applied to this fi eld of human cooperation.25 As he writes about the 
method: “[i]t has not been tried at any time with use of all the resources that scientifi c 
material and the experimental method now put at our disposal.”26 Today, we cannot hold 
such an optimistic view neither in relation to science nor to social and political problems. 
Second, the very idea of the method of democracy can be questioned by the inequality 
argument, which claims that due to power relations in the real world, diverse opinions and 
value systems do not carry equal weight in negotiations.27 Even though Dewey is concer-
ned about the “inchoate public,”28 he does not pay much attention to this strategic aspect 
of negotiations.29 
It is here that the Gramscian interpretation of hegemony and, in particular, Gramsci’s 
concepts of consent and coherence, become useful. Th ese concepts, in our view, help us to 
understand more adequately the process of constituting a “voice” as well as the process of 
marginalizing some other voices. 
Gramsci and the Coherence and Consent in Constituting a “Voice”
In this section, we will focus on two issues that appear to be problematic for Dewey’s 
method: fi rst, the diffi  culties of the marginalized voices in producing contributions that 
would be coherent enough to be listened to and taken into account, and second, the need 
for conceptualizing the power-related processes that determine the very formulation of 
potential solutions.30 In order to draw attention to these limitations, we derive our concep-
tual tools from Gramsci’s philosophy and his ideas on hegemony.31
25 See, for example, Dewey, LW11, 65.
26 Dewey, LW11, 38.
27 See also Roudy W. Hildreth, “Reconstructing Dewey of Power,” Political Th eory, 37 (2009), doi: 
10.1177/0090591709345454.
28 Dewey, LW2, 314-328.
29 Th is criticism has been presented by many scholars, not only regarding Dewey’s philosophy but also regarding phi-
losophical pragmatism in general. Hildreth, however, has formulated an argument responding to these critiques. 
Accordingly, “power is an integral but implicit element of Dewey’s conception of human experience.” See Hildreth, 
“Reconstructing Dewey of Power,” 780. 
30 Leona M. English and Peter Mayo (eds.), Learning with Adults. A Critical Pedagogic Introduction (Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers, 2012); see also Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
31 Gramsci’s theoretical legacy is fragmented and is mainly presented in the letters and unfi nished notebooks from 
his imprisonment. Th e concept of hegemony has Greek origins in reference to leadership. For Gramsci, two sour-
ces of the concept were of central relevance. First, he discussed the theory of the ethico-political history of the 
Italian idealist philosopher Croce. Second, the Russian debate over the gegemoniya in the proletarian revolution, in 
contrast to the proletarian dictatorship, was an important source of inspiration. See Perry Anderson, “Th e Antino-
mies of Antonio Gramsci,” New Left Review I (100) (1976), retrieved from http://newleftreview.org. Th e concept of 
hegemony as a leading role of the proletariat in revolution was further extended to refer to the hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie over the proletariat, which was exercised in the sphere of ideology and culture rather than economy 
(Anderson, 18). Th is interpretation of hegemony and dictatorship as being an alternative strategy is challenged 
by Peter D. Th omas, Th e Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Leiden: Brill, 2009): 163, doi: 
10.1163/ej.9789004167711.i-478. Here Th omas argues that consent attached to the characteristics of hegemony 
and coercion in a dictatorship in Gramsci’s analysis are in a dialectical relationship rather than posited as alternati-
ves. 
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Gramsci’s formulation of the concept of hegemony continues to be appropriated and 
debated in contemporary political and social research. While its defi nition is still being con-
tested, in this article we base our argument on the interpretation of the Gramscian notion 
of hegemony as a way of maintaining the power of a certain group through “intellectual 
and moral leadership.”32 Th erefore, hegemony as a form of power is not based only on eco-
nomic relations but also includes the cultural means of gaining and maintaining hegemony. 
We consider the notions of coherence characteristic to hegemony as being necessary to 
supplementing the Deweyan method of democracy.
Our fi rst question concerns the quality and origin of the diff erent voices participating 
in democratic problem-solving. Here, we are inspired by Gramsci’s notion of coherence. In 
regard to hegemony, Gramsci is concerned about the ability of the subaltern groups to 
take part in social debate, and maintains that in order for their voices to constitute a real 
challenge to the prevailing hegemony, they should be based on a critical and coherent “”. 
While “being heard” is a cornerstone of the method of democracy, we suggest that in order 
for a “voice” to be heard, let alone motivating some sort of action, it should possess some 
degree of coherence, as well as a critical understanding of the rules of the game. Accord-
ing to Gramsci, such a critical achievement requires realization and refl ection upon one’s 
historical situation and the limitations provided by the language used in framing the prob-
lems. Gramsci argues that our conception of the world is often mechanically imposed by 
the social environment or refl ects the ideology of the ruling groups, which is disseminated, 
for example, through education.33 Creating one’s own critical and coherent conception of 
the world therefore requires acknowledgement and critical analysis of one’s own historical 
position. 
With respect to the idea of intelligence, following Gramsci, we should keep in mind 
that the conceptions concerning societal problems and their societal contexts held by the 
commonly marginalized groups are usually fragmentary and incoherent. In Gramscian 
terms, such knowledge is practical and spontaneous, and based on direct experience.34 It 
is not powerful enough for participation and contributions to struggles over hegemony. 
Consequently, it can be claimed that such knowledge does not constitute a “voice” that is 
coherent enough to be intelligently included in the framework of the method of democr-
acy.
How, then, could it be possible to improve the coherence of the voice of a marginalized 
group whereby it could be used in arguments in a democratic context? Th e Gramscian 
suggestion of producing coherence into what he refers as the common sense provides a 
potential way of conceptualizing of such a process. For Gramsci, the common sense of 
people refers to the “diff use, uncoordinated features of generic form of thought common 
32 Gramsci, SPN, 57.
33 Ibid., 324-325.
34 Ibid., 198-199. 
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to a particular period and a particular popular environment.”35 Th us, the main problem 
with common sense is its lack of unity and coherence in allowing for concise articulation 
and further advocacy. 
As a way out of this problem, Gramsci suggests focusing on the positive and innovative 
aspects of common sense in order to foster the emergence of unity and coherence, that is, 
good sense.36 Th e process of establishing coherence is at the core of Gramsci’s idea of the 
philosophy of praxis as a dialectical process of critical engagement with common sense 
and the particular problems raised by the masses, in conjunction with a critique of the 
existing philosophy of traditional intellectuals.37 In this way, it would be possible to produce 
knowledge that is “superior to common sense” while ensuring that this knowledge is still in 
contact with practical activity and organic to the experiences of the masses.38 Th is process, 
according to Gramsci, would require the leadership of organic intellectuals who originate 
from the subaltern groups themselves.39 
For Gramsci, the coherence of knowledge should lead to political action, and in his 
particular historical context, into societal hegemony earned by the proletariat. If Dewey’s 
experimental method opposes the a priori goals of negotiation, a Gramscian perspective 
would lead us to set goals in relation to changes in social power relations while considering 
the voices of the subaltern classes to be of the utmost importance.40 In other words, if the 
inclusion of multiple voices for Dewey is more of an epistemological question, for Gramsci, 
the production of a coherent voice for the marginalized is merely a strategy in the struggle 
for the hegemony of the proletariat and the peasants, two of the main subaltern groups 
discussed in his work. 
We now turn to discussing the notion of consent in gaining hegemony in the context of 
the Deweyan idea of intelligence. Consent, in contrast to coercion, is the main way through 
which power is exercised. Hegemonic power works by establishing consent to a certain 
world view and existing social power relations through various institutions in society. . For 
Gramsci, an example of how hegemonic power works is the prevailing and unquestioned 
35 Ibid., 330.
36 Steven Jones, Antonio Gramsci (London: Routledge, 2006), 54-55.
37 Ibid., 330-335.
38 Ibid., 330.
39 Ibid., 6, 15-16.
40 Th e question of predefi ned ends is, of course, a broad philosophical question which cannot be discussed within 
the limits of this article (see, for example, Katariina Holma, “Th e Critical Spirit: Emotional and Moral Dimensions 
of Critical Th inking,” Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi  4 no. 1 (2015): 26-27. Th e idea of focusing on marginalized voices 
is not, however, in contradiction with Dewey’s philosophy. Rather, he should be interpreted as being reluctant to 
postulate any ends as a priori in the process of negotiation and critical thinking. Another diff erence from Gramsci 
is related to Gramsci’s commitment to the primary (epistemological) importance of marginalized voices. Dewey, 
again, would not assume a priori epistemological importance to any voice. Yet another diff erence is related to the 
defi nition of the marginalized, which Gramsci articulates in Marxist vocabulary, whereas Dewey’s notion is more 
open to the contextual variety of “marginalized.” In the later use of Gramscian thinking in post-colonial studies, dis-
course analysis, subaltern studies, feminist studies, and the like, the notion of “hegemonic” and “subaltern” groups 
has occupied increasing variety.
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consent of the population to the leading position of the current dominant group.41 Such 
consent, in turn, may be given as a result of the economic position of the ruling group or 
the cultural and political leadership exercised by it.42 Educational institutions, mass media 
and civil society associations are especially central to the production of cultural hegemony. 
When certain views and perspectives of the world are continuously represented and 
repeated in the workings of these institutions, people will consent to these views as taken-
for-granted state of aff airs. Th erefore, being refl ective of diff erent strategies of producing 
consent becomes central for constituting a “voice”. 43 
Returning to the method of democracy, both the strategies of gaining hegemony and 
the mechanisms for maintaining it are important. Th e main question, though, concerns 
the kinds of strategies used to enable some voices to become hegemonic in the process of 
Dewey’s idea of experimentation, and more specifi cally, how these voices obtain consent 
from other groups in order to arrive at a shared solution. Gramsci identifi es a number 
of strategies for obtaining such consent.44 First, he mentions alliance building,45 which 
includes transcending particular interests and adopting the interests of other groups,46 as 
well as contributing to the increased coherence of the “voice” of the group in order to reach 
a solution.47 Second, there is a strategy of gradual absorption and recruitment of the lead-
ers of critical groups for them to adapt to the interests of the hegemonic groups.48 Th ird, 
the divisions and positions of expertise established by the education system facilitates the 
provision of consent to the particular voices presented by the “specialists” as defi ned by the 
forces in control of bourgeois education.49 Even today, positions requiring a certain kind 
of academic education are typically valued more in terms of prestige and salary than, for 
example, positions requiring technical expertise.
As a result of this interpretation, we suggest that in applying the democratic method 
to solving social problems, an analysis of the dynamics of alliance building, persuading the 
voices of other groups to fi t with the group’s own voice, and the weight of certain kinds of 
expert knowledge, among other factors, should be acknowledged. When these are not paid 
41 Gramsci, SPN, 12-13.
42 Gramsci, SPN, 12-13.
43 Originally, Gramsci was interested in strategies for gaining proletarian hegemony. Later, he also analyzed the 
mechanisms for gaining and maintaining existing bourgeois hegemony in order to better understand the dynamics 
by which such hegemony is established, Th omas, Th e Gramscian Moment.
44 Gramsci discussed these strategies in relation to a variety of phenomena in his time, such as the question of the 
gap between the modern North and the agrarian South in Italy (SPW), the question of the Moderate Party gaining 
hegemony over the Action Party in the period of the Risorgimento (SPN), and the role of education and other cul-
tural institutions in maintaining the hegemony of the ruling group (SPN). Gramsci, SPW II refers to Selection from 
Political Writings 1921-1926. (1978) Translated and edited by Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
45 Gramsci, SPW II, 441-462.
46 Benedetto Fontana, “Hegemony and Rhetoric: Political Education,” in Gramsci and Education, eds.. Carmel Borg, 
Joseph A. Buttigieg, Peter Mayo (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 2002), 28–29.
47 Wolfgang F. Haug, “Philosophizing with Marx, Gramsci, and Brecht,” Boundary, 2 (2007): 151-153.
48 Gramsci, SPN, 58-59, doi: 10.1215/01903659-2007-019.
49 Carmel Borg et al. eds., Gramsci and Education (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 2002), 8-9. See also 
Gramsci, SPN, 40.
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attention to, the participation processes might turn out to be democratic only on surface. 
However, acknowledging such hidden hegemonic processes require specifi c competencies 
from those who participate in the democratic problem solving and decision making
Th e Question of Adult Education: Citizens’ competencies 
We will now refl ect on the implications of our philosophical analysis in the previous section 
on contemporary adult education in the pursuit of citizens’ competencies. On the basis of 
our synthesis of the Deweyan method of democracy and the Gramscian interpretation of 
the notions of coherence and consent, we stress three ways in which competencies can be 
developed among citizens: (1) education outside of the classroom and learning from par-
ticipation in societal activities; (2) the employment of strategies to learn a shared language 
and establish a coherent voice for democratic participation; and (3) learning to identify and 
apply strategies for the process of obtaining and establishing consent. 
As philosophers of education, Dewey and Gramsci did not only recommend changes 
for school systems and educational practices; they also saw the importance of education 
and learning in the informal sphere through participation and activism in everyday life, 
including work. Today, the increased social division of labor and professionalization has led 
to a reduction in the average citizen’s capabilities to participate in debates on a number 
of social problems.50 Simultaneously, the increasing complexity of these problems, such as 
climate change and global economic crises, has resulted in new demands with respect to 
citizens’ capacities. As a consequence, the problems confronted by contemporary societies 
indicate that the competencies facilitated by formal education do not of themselves suffi  ce 
in allowing citizens to exercise active citizenship during their entire life-span. In contrast, 
these competencies are gradually acquired through the processes of participating in work 
places, communities, and society in general.51 Th us, continuous learning by participating in 
multiple arenas of society is a necessity for meaningful citizen participation.
Both Dewey and Gramsci, in their own ways, were preoccupied with the connection 
between education and the possibilities for democracy. Despite their theoretical diff eren-
ces, both thought that genuine democracy necessitated widespread participation, and 
they fi rmly believed in peoples’ capabilities to participate in democratic institutions and 
practices. Dewey’s idea of the intelligence of all and Gramsci’s claim that every man is a 
philosopher together place a common man— instead of an elite expert—at the center of 
social problem-solving. 
However, the Deweyan notion of people’s everyday intelligence in relation to their 
living circumstances can be challenged by Gramsci’s understanding of common sense. For 
Gramsci, the common sense of the people is not suffi  cient for analyzing political problems 
50 Joseph A. Buttigieg, “Education, the Role of Intellectuals, and Democracy: A Gramscian Refl ection,” in Gramsci and 
Education, eds. Carmel Borg et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 2002), 132.
51 See also Leona English and Peter Mayo, Learning with Adults.
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and changing social situations; instead, it is in need of further development and refi ne-
ment into a more coherent form of knowledge. Furthermore, according to Gramsci, not 
everyone has the natural capacities for the cultural and political leadership required for 
changing hegemonic relations; these capacities therefore need to be improved in those 
who possess them.52 Dewey was not blind to the problem of “the inchoate public” either; 
he believed that the diff erent cultural, religious, and linguistic groups who share the same 
political space need education in order to learn the language of “experimentalese,” which 
was necessary for participating in the processes of solving shared problems.53 
Following Gramsci, we propose that one important aspect of learning “experimenta-
lese” and achieving a collective voice that is able to participate in shared decision making 
relates to the competencies for building the very coherence that is needed for such a voice 
to emerge. For Gramsci, the most relevant competencies include an ability to critically ana-
lyze the conditions of the situation and the eff ects of hegemony in defi ning the problem 
and proposed set of solutions; for Dewey, such competency mainly includes the ability to 
engage in meaningful interaction and joint experimentation in pluralist contexts. All in 
all, the implication for adult education is that learning certain strategies to gain a shared 
language and a coherent voice for democratic participation must be fostered. Th is entails 
encouraging, mobilizing, and facilitating groups to participate with each other, engage in 
coherence building, and further the learning of “experimentalese” in interaction with other 
groups. 
Whereas Dewey is mainly preoccupied with the individual and group level competen-
cies for participation in shared problem solving, Gramsci pays more attention to the social 
and economic power relations both enabling and hindering participation. As the ultimate 
goal for learning and participation for Gramsci was the transformation of class relations, 
the central citizenship competencies therefore include the ability to analyze the functions 
of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In Gramsci’s view, a change in the social power rela-
tions requires increasing theoretical and practical consciousness in order to contest the 
prevailing common sense.54 In contemporary Western societies, where the complex set of 
power relations cannot be reduced only to class, and where the explicit use of state power 
in form of coercion is relatively rare, the ability to identify cultural and political hegemonies 
has become increasingly important. Learning both to identify the ways in which consent 
has been produced in the context of framing the problems to be discussed and to facilitate 
consent in favor of the group’s coherent voice are essential processes. Citizens should be 
able to identify how the problems have been framed, how the society-level consent has 
52 Harold Entwistle, Antonio Gramsci. Conservative Schooling for Radical Politics (London: Routledge, 1979), 112, 125. 
53 Dewey, LW2, 314-328; see also Leonard J. Waks, “Post-Experimentalist Pragmatism,” Studies in Philosophy and Edu-
cation 17 (1997): 17, doi: 10.1023/A:1004937320174.
54 Stanley Aronowitz, “Gramsci’s Th eory of Education: Schooling and Beyond,” in Gramsci and Education, eds. C. Borg 
et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 2002), 115.
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been obtained, and be alert to the potential “there is no alternative” policies behind the 
perceived set of solutions. 
In real life situations, the Deweyan ideals of everything being open to discussion and 
the best solution being found via the process of discussion and experimentation are often 
hampered by pre-existing political and economic interests that pre-defi ne what is and is 
not open to discussion. Furthermore, in situations where a group’s voice has gained suf-
fi cient coherence to enter into democratic problem solving negotiations, citizens should 
have the competencies to generate consent in relation to their concerns, for example, by 
being able to build alliances. In the context of plurality, Gramsci’s original suggestion of the 
need for the working class to gain the consent of the peasants, another subaltern group 
in Italy in Gramsci’s time, is applicable to a wide variety of groups such as people of diff e-
rent genders, sexual orientations, ethnic origins, disabilities, or long-term unemployed. His 
idea of the main means of alliance building as learning others’ worldviews and languages 
is especially relevant today.55 In today’s societies, the ability to perceive problems from the 
viewpoint of other value systems is a necessary condition for eff ective alliance building to 
solve shared problems.
Conclusions
 Democratic participation is challenged by the increasing amount of various cultural, ethnic, 
and religious groups having diff erent value systems and varying educational backgrounds. 
At the same time, the increasing complexity of social and political problems enables poli-
tical elites to make decisions without any real process of democratic decision-making. Th e 
voices of diff erent groups are rarely included in solving shared problems, let alone in the 
processes of defi ning those problems. In the current policy environment, marginalization 
does not only apply to the “traditional” marginalized groups, but also the so-called elites, 
such as academics and middle-class employees struggling to participate due to the ways 
in which such problems have started to directly aff ect them, for example as results from 
the economic crisis or austerity measures especially eff ecting labor in information and 
knowledge industry. Th e lack of coherence in their voice implies that the particular views, 
interests, and concerns of many members and groups within our democracies never enter 
the arenas where the method of democracy is exercised. Without coherence, their voices 
remain scattered and are articulated mainly in everyday conversations at home or at work, 
or in discussion forums on the internet. Th erefore, the process of “growth into citizenship” 
in the contemporary era is an ongoing eff ort of learning by experimenting and participa-
ting in the continuous eff orts of coherence building and the establishment of consent. 
In this article, we have focused on two philosophers who have developed conceptions 
of democracy as participation, and, in particular, educational theories related to the com-
55 Gramsci, SPW II.
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petences of citizens in such democracies. We have constructed a synthesis of the Deweyan 
conception of the method of democracy, based on the philosophical background of plura-
lism and fallibilism, and the Gramscian conception of hegemony as a form of power based 
on consent, having its background in Marxist philosophy. In our view, this synthesis provi-
des a fruitful departure point for reconsidering the relationship between democracy and 
education in today’s societies. 
We have discussed the implications of our synthesis in the context of informal adult 
education. In our view, many of the competencies required of the citizen of a contemporary 
pluralist democracy are learned by participating in the processes of shared problem-solving 
in workplaces, communities, associations, and society in general. We suggested, in a Gram-
scian spirit, that adult education should focus on facilitating the learning of strategies to 
establish a coherent voice, and in a Deweyan fashion, the learning of “experimentalese” for 
general productive interaction and listening to other groups.
We have also discussed the challenge faced by educational institutions based on the 
way in which social power relations aff ect the possibilities of participation. Borrowing from 
Gramsci, we suggest that education should focus on identifying how the so-called shared 
problems have been framed in order to obtain the critical tools required for challenging 
“there is no alternative” policies.  
Proposing a detailed outline for adult education capable of providing competencies for 
citizenship in today’s complex societies is a challenging task. Our synthesis of Deweyan and 
Gramscian philosophies aims to contribute to the task of ultimately constructing a theore-
tical approach to adult education, which could include both the Deweyan optimism in the 
possibilities of genuine democracy and the Gramscian emphasis on critical consciousness 
as a necessary condition for substantive participation.
